Collision of fundamentalism and terrorism: the importance of interdisciplinary perspective

Sofiya Valeeva

The Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. Email: Sofiya.L.valeeva@gmail.com

Shrnutí

Střetání fundamentalismu a terorismu: význam interdisciplinární perspektivy.“ Hlavním tématem příspěvku je rozdíl mezi náboženským fundamentalismem a terorismem. Zkoumá a vymezuje náboženský fundamentalismus a předkládá nástin neurobiologického základu religiozity. V krátkosti příspěvek seznamuje s koncepty, z nichž vychází tradiční výzkum terorismu, a upozorňuje na některé jejich nápadné nedostatky. Zkoumá možnosti využití Hofferovy teorie povahy masových hnutí (která obvykle není ve studiu terorismu vůbec aplikována) jako nového zastřešující paradigmatu výzkumu terorismu. Předkládaný článek mapuje současný stav výzkumu na poli fundamentalismu a terorismu a načrtává možnosti dalšího výzkumu.

Summary

“Collision of fundamentalism and terrorism: the importance of interdisciplinary perspective.“ The article’s major focus is the distinction between religious fundamentalism and terrorism. It explores and defines religious fundamentalism as well as overviews neurobiological bases of religiosity. The article gives a brief introduction of traditional concepts behind terrorism research and some glaring fallacies of said concepts. It explores the possibility of Hoffer’s theory on nature of mass movements, that is not commonly used in terrorism evaluation, being an inclusive new paradigm in terrorism research. The present article overviews the current state of research in the field of fundamentalism and terrorism, as well as outlines the possibilities for future research.


Introduction

The term terrorism has been replaced by mass media with the term fundamentalism, religious fundamentalism to be exact. Something that originally described Christian opposition to modernism is now put in the same line with terrorism, extremism, radicalism and authoritarianism.[1] Funny enough, this semantics lands us in a methodologically desperate situation, considering that anyone who takes their religion seriously and religious text literally now falls down into terrorism-inclusive fundamentalist category.[2] Yet not all religious fundamentalists become terrorists, nor all terrorists are religious. How are we ought to determine the probability of a certain individuals having an inclination to use unauthorised violence or intimidation against civilians[3] to further their political agenda[4] or influence their target audience or their behaviour in a particular way[5], when we are essentially examining the depth of belief in religious teaching and reflecting on existence of essential truths regarding human identity?[6] The confusion between fundamentalism and terrorism as well as the number of available definitions of those terms sure does not help, nor does the shift towards anecdotal psychological portraits of modern Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, a.k.a. Muslim extremists we encounter since September 11.

There is a considerable amount of literature written on both terrorism and fundamentalism, their origins and ways to combat them. Yet there is a pre-existent bias regarding those topics. Type of fundamentalism examined often revolves around violent radicalization inside the religious movements and its mostly political origins, while nonviolent radicalisation in religious and nonreligious movements alike keeps getting ignored. Yet if we want to prevent violent attacks on our society we might want to dig deeper and try to not only distinguish between fundamentalist individuals that use terror and violence and those who are just religiously orthodox, as well as try to determine what makes one type of fundamentalism bleed into another. Special attention shall be paid to classifications of terrorists and the underlying neurobiological condition. After all, terrorism is abnormal human behaviour that is known to humanity for a really long time.[7]

Fundamentalism, religion and higher-order cognitive processes

Fundamentalism in the broadest sense is strict adherence to the basic principles of any subject or discipline. It can be defined as a dominant idea or belief that is commonly resistant to criticism, even evidence.[8] ٫[9] The term often refers to ‘militant rejection’ of something (e.g. modernity, culture, a way of life, etc.), rather than a specific doctrine.[10]

Religious fundamentalism on the other hand is just a form of religious beliefs, which are mental representations that typically include conviction in existence of supernatural or spiritual realities that are transmitted socially.[11] Religious fundamentalism can be defined as a cognitive construct rooted in belief that there are specific religious teachings that contain some fundamental truths regarding humanity that the believer shall follow on the daily bases to achieve a particular relationship with God.[12] It is typical for religious fundamentalists to overlook empirical evidence, develop in-group identity and an out-group bias.[13] Religious fundamentalism has also been linked to hostile attitudes towards out-groups[14] and violence[15], which is an alarming message. Evolutionary speaking, this type of behaviour is socially functional since it gives a sense of unity and uniformity inside the religious in-group.[16] On the other hand, religious fundamentalism and behaviour associated with it is a lot closer to being an ideology rather than an empirical belief system.[17]

A fascinating finding is that religiosity, one of the major and widespread behavioural phenomena present in all known cultures, is believed to be influenced by genetics to the same degree as intelligence. It depends on recently evolved brain pathways[18] that in other mammals are concerned with exploring distant portions of 3-D space that surrounds them.[19]

From a neurobiological perspective, systems that lead to rigidity and inflexibility in one’s beliefs are poorly understood, yet prefrontal cortex (PFC) is considered to play a major role in representing social beliefs that are the cornerstone of most religions.[20] Cognitive flexibility also depends on PFC.[21] Impairment in cognitive flexibility that plays a major role in updating empirical believes according to accumulated evidence is considered to be the reason why religious fundamentalism is so resistant to reason.[22] Particularly dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is associated with formation of memories resistant to distraction[23] and switching between rule sets,[24] while ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is considered critical for social belief representation and maintenance. Lesions to this region result in more radical statements on political and religious topics and are believed to induce fundamentalism.[25]

Understanding brain areas involved gives us the possibility to hypothesize about individual characteristics that contribute to a mind of fundamentalist. For instance, openness that is associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)[26] ٫[27] plays a role in religious and political beliefs.[28] ٫[29] Connection of political and religious beliefs to a certain personal characteristic and brain area is further supported by Iannaccone’s concept of time economy that predicts that the more time one spends on religious traditions, the less time one has to spend on other activities including political.[30] A study done by Driskell, Embry, and Lyon also revealed a negative correlation between religious beliefs and political participation in a sense that macro beliefs (collective experiences and identification with a religious movement) reduce political participation.[31]

Openness, or rather lack of it, can potentially increase political participation,[32] or lead to more profound religiosity and spirituality.[33] This is further supported by Hoffer’s theory of how a certain movement, religious per say, can be substituted by another type of movement (political, national, etc.).[34] The premise is that ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) lesions result in fundamentalist tendencies, while volume loss in dlPFC has an effect on cognitive flexibility and the degree of openness, which indirectly affects fundamentalist beliefs.[35]

Another study by Cristofori et al. found correlation between damage to frontal and temporal brain regions, specifically dlPFC and middle and/or superior temporal cortex (TC), and mystical experience, which underlines religious beliefs.[36] Interesting fact is, that despite inability to isolate mystical religious experience to a single brain region, the areas held accountable for mysticism (dlPFC, TC) according to accumulated empirical data are the same regions that play a role in delusional symptoms in patients suffering from schizophrenia, high levels of neuroticism, mania, depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder.[37] ٫[38]

Overall, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence supporting the dependence of religious fundamentalism on the functioning of PFC, linking it to higher-order cognitive processes. That is a shame that this knowledge rarely leaves the field of neuroscience and is almost never incorporated into terrorism research.

Terrorism and its (im)possible theoretical bases

Important thing to remember is that religious belief systems emerge along with other beliefs (political, moral, etc.), which further supports the view, that religious fundamentalism is more of an ideology and shall be treated like one. Religious fundamentalism as an aggravated response to the ever-changing market economy, democratic regimes and modernity in general along with the privatization of weapons of mass destruction indirectly contributes to potential terrorist attacks.[39] The amount of classifications[40] and highly hierarchical nature of terrorism makes it hard to pinpoint the type of individual that might be attracted to terrorist organisations.[41] Statistically speaking, a typical terrorists in the 60s and 70s were predominantly male in their mid-twenties, well-educated, with a middle-class background.[42] ٫[43] Typical terrorist of the 80s was in his late teens to early twenties, not well educated, with lower class background coming from a large family.[44] ٫[45] The 90s and the beginning of the 21st century brought us a new terrorist profile: a wide variety of demographic and occupation ranging from university students to professionals, from married males in their forties to young single females.[46] ٫[47] This leads us to realization that it is no longer possible to pinpoint the risk group by relying on a single characteristic (e.g. poverty,  political affiliation, exposure to glorification of violence, etc.). Nowadays, supporters of terrorism are far more often found among professionals and white collars with at least some level of secondary or even higher education, rather than among poor and uneducated.[48] ٫[49]٫[50] When it comes to religious and secular terrorists, an interesting fact is that most come from families that are either radically involved themselves or support such activism, which makes peer support an important factor in joining radical groups.[51]

There is a number of theories regarding how and why one becomes a terrorist. Ranging from economic and political to psychosocial and evolutionary; they generally overlap in their premises, yet come to vastly different conclusions. The most popular among them is psychological theory, which rests on the premise that in order to become a terrorist one has to have mental problems, which generally implies some sort of psychosis when one cannot tell right from wrong, or psychopathic tendencies, a.k.a. antisocial personality disorder, which is an illustrative example of one being capable to tell right from wrong but choosing to behave in a deviant manner to pursue personal agenda and feeling no remorse for doing so.[52] ٫[53]٫[54]٫[55]

Another theory rooted in psychology is narcissism theory. It is based on Kohut’s self-psychology, which implies that failure in empathy development during infancy can lead to narcissistic injury and prevent the development of moral principles in adulthood.[56] Crayton furthered this theory by proposing that certain political experiences might lead to narcissistic injury in adulthood through reawakening the infantile trauma.[57] This, according to Crayton, can lead to the genesis of the leader or the genesis of the follower (or a combination of both), which have the potential to grow into narcissistic rage. The theory heavily implies the projection of individual frustration with oneself and prior trauma onto innocent people in a form of terrorist attack. However, there is no coherent evidence to establish that narcissism among terrorists is more common than among general population.[58] Just like there is no evidence to support that narcissism alone is a valid characteristic capable of causing interest in radical movements like terrorism.

Post’s paranoia theory[59] falls into the same psychological category and overlaps a lot with narcissism theory, mainly in the lack of controlled studies and the desire to blame distant, unprovable psychological trauma for violent outbursts against humanity.

Despite the popularity of psychological approach among scholars, mainly due to the inability to comprehend how one can engage in violent attacks against innocent people in a normal state of mind, evidence coming from empirical research begs to differ: terrorists do not commonly suffer from mental illnesses or meet criteria of insanity set up by psychiatry; nor do they predominantly exhibit traits of psychopathic behaviour, narcissistic disorder or paranoia symptoms.[60] ٫[61]٫[62]٫[63]

The rational choice theory that attempts to explain how socioeconomic changes can potentially influence behaviour of terrorists should be classified as unfit purely because it assumes that humans operate on evidence-based observation and logical assumptions that lead them to rational choices. Fastly occurring neuroscientific evidence makes nonsense of this theory proving that humans develop belief systems first and accumulate evidence in its defence later.[64] Moreover, the interpretation of the information in our brain is only as good as our perception of that information, which is another thing we as human struggle with due to our various reasons, including biases.[65] ٫[66]٫[67]

Another reason against this theory is that needs terrorists try to achieve do not justify the means.[68] Purported end goal is usually unachievable by the selected action as well as attacks on innocent people can hardly be classified as rational action, even if we consider in-group and out-group dynamics. We, as humans, are by no means inferno of irrationality, yet we are exceptionally lousy at reasoning and intuitive statistics.[69] Furthermore, claims of predictive success of rational choice theory are commonly based on post-hoc analysis of events or worse, are derived from studies, observations and interviews that feature nonterrorists, typically college students, that take place in lab conditions, which fail to recreate real-life circumstances.[70] ٫[71]

Despite terrorism proving itself to be an efficient and relatively low-cost weapon in achieving political goals throughout history it hardly proves the rationality of the chosen means. Just like relative success of the rational choice theory in predicting outcomes of various policy options does not help us to build a functional terrorist profile, without which any suggestion this theory gives us regarding the probable behaviour of terrorists is nothing but guesswork. After all, individuals who see terrorism as a viable and rational option in achieving their goals rarely become terrorists themselves.[72] Overall, accepting the theory of rational choice and its predictions is not only highly dangerous, since it does not account for plasticity of human nervous system, hence, individualized response,[73] it also is renunciation from common sense.

Social learning theory implies that one could become a terrorist through learning from propagandistic materials issued by terrorist cell or from witnessing terror and violence in their social surroundings.[74] If rational choice theory discussed prior is renunciation from common sense, then social learning theory is mother and father of all renunciation. Not only it fails to provide any hard evidence, it also has no means to explain the fact that only a small percentage of individuals that share religious and political views with terrorist cells or are exposed to the public glorification of terrorism actually become terrorists.

At first glance, oppression theory makes a lot of sense. Not only is there an evident correlation between oppression and political violence, especially when it comes to national and ethnical terrorism, government attacks on one’s freedom and dignity have been named among reasons behind joining a terrorist cell.[75]٫[76]٫[77] Unfortunately, there is lack of evidence to support this vastly popular theory, since there is no unified measuring tool for oppression. Sadly, theory’s unprovability due to non-existent methodology is not the biggest problem. Oppression is often met with political violence, yet not all oppressed are capable to rebel against the system. People may be discriminated against for years, even generations before they act upon it. Those who do usually fall within the following categories: 1) the recently oppressed, which have a vivid memory of better life imprinted in their brain, 2) the abjectly oppressed who’s conditions improved to the point that good life seems within reach, 3) the free, which seek means to escape the multitude of choice modern world has to offer, 4) the unified that find themselves in disintegrating collective with few social and family bonds, 5) the impotent in mind or body, which due to a decline in their physical or mental abilities cannot pursue their life goal, 6) the minorities that are trying to integrate, the most successful and unsuccessful of which typically feel the most oppressed, 7) the bored. But, most importantly, the use of political violence normally occurs not as a response to oppression, but rather as a reaction to a mild elevation of said oppression.[78]

The frustration-aggression theory that is attributed to Yale university’s political and social scientist collaboration[79] and is indirectly supported by a later work of brilliant social theorist Eric Hoffer, links violent behaviour to frustration.[80] The original theory was an attempt to explain human aggression and had a significant impact on all behavioural sciences.[81] The Yale team defined frustration in a unique manner. Frustration in their theory was not an affective state, but rather an event, which allowed them to describe it and test its causal effects (for instance on aggression). Originally, they have boldly stated that frustration is always followed by aggressive behaviour.[82]

The theory has been heavily criticized by fellow scientists. Some of them have dismissed the importance of the relationship between frustration and aggression,[83] while others have acknowledged some possible benefits of the theory.[84] The general consensus was that frustration-aggression theory was a new approach to the topic with some interesting implications on animal and human studies, yet there was a shortage of empirical evidence to establish a solid connection between the two. After receiving criticism, Yale scholars clarified their statement in a later paper saying that aggression is one of possible outcomes of frustration, but not the only outcome.[85]

Relative deprivation theory essentially emerged from the frustration-aggression theory[86]  and is based on claims made by Gurr[87] that individuals rebel when they find conditions around them to be unbearable. Later studies have built on this claim by pointing out that there is a distinct correlation between poverty and terrorism.[88] ٫[89] This theory has some phytosociological and economical ground since not only postmodern individual finds poverty humiliating, he also sees himself as a victim of globalization, while globalized world provides him with the possibility to connect with other frustrated individuals wronged by the system. Moreover, economic inequality is no stranger to being a fuel for political and social violence. This, however, is hardly a spectacular conclusion, since the poor are on the top of multiple risk lists due to their attraction to terrorism-including mass movements. However, poverty alone is not capable of explaining sentiment for terrorism, since a decent percentage of them come from middle class, as has been stated prior in this article. Poverty and social injustice can certainly lead to interest in terrorism, however, those factors along are nonpredictive of the end results.[90]

An old/new inclusive theory

The other scholar that toyed with frustration is Hoffer, who does not focus on frustration-aggression paradigm in the same way as Yale scholars. He understands frustration not as an event in itself, but rather as an important social phenomenon. In his theory, a chain of social event like poverty, selfishness, boredom, criminality, etc., contribute to the level of frustration within the society and when it reaches a certain level it can lead to receptiveness to mass movements if the outside conditions (e.g. existence of fanatics in the society, etc.) align with the level of individual frustration. Hoffer states that frustration is one of the major prerequisites for becoming an adept of any (terrorist including) mass movement. He argues that frustration with individual existence not only causes further characteristics (united action, self-sacrifice, etc.) commonly found in adapts of mass movements in general and terrorists in particular, but that leaders of those movements knowingly inflame frustration in their followers and try to develop and strengthen inclinations and reaction inherent to the frustrated mind. However, Hoffer acknowledges that being frustrated does not necessarily amount to aggression or even interest in joining a radically oriented union. He lists a number of social groups that have the potential to adhere to radical ideologies (poor, misfits, minorities, bored, impotent in body or mind, selfish, ambitious) each with further classifications and restrictions. His elegant theory ties together a multitude of criteria that must be present in individual, society and movement itself for them to collide together, creating a dangerous compound. He also proposes what I like to call a ‘substitute theory’, which implies that when one is ready to join a mass movement he does not look for a particular doctrine, in fact, adapts tend to drift from movement to movement.[91] Potential adept is a prime example of symmetry breaking in social sciences. He is like a ball on top of a symmetric hill, the smallest fluctuation can determine one of the equally likely outcomes and trigger an adept to pick a movement. The idea of random selection is not popular among scholars, probably because it implies that individual has equal chances at joining a terrorist cell or a left-wing authoritarian party, but it most likely is true. After all, random selection is what brought us all into this world.

Terrorism is commonly treated as a thing of its own. Even the most inclusive theories fail to understand that it is nothing but an ugly biproduct of a movement that can have a political, religious, social nature, or combine all those attributes. Our concentration on inhumanity of this biproduct blindfolds us and does not allow to see a bigger picture. A theory as broad as Hoffer’s theory of mass movements is capable to unite other theories (individual and crowd psychology, leadership theory, etc.) under a single paradigm and still have room for implementing neuroscientific research with respect to the plasticity of human nervous system. Its multitude of levels (individual, crowd, movement) and possibility of implementation of knowledge acquired by sociology, psychology, neuroscience, medicine, etc. is a particularly desirable start point for furthering terrorist research.

Taking this theory into consideration we can potentially explain why some individuals within a terrorist cell are active and end up committing horrible crimes, while others remain latent. My best guess is the level of polarisation within the movement is to blame. After all, most basic leadership or group psychology theory will tell you that hierarchy and job differentiation is vital for existence any group. That perhaps is why among the most likeminded people some become suicide bombers while others meticulously plan these attacks but never actually partake in them.

Conclusion

I enjoy a good theory of mind as much as the next guy, but I am a biologist at heart and truly believe that the key to identifying what makes a terrorist different[92] from individuals with similar background does not lie in abstractions, which psychology and other social sciences are concerned with; but rather in empirical research that will eventually identify cognitive traits and behavioural patterns that are statistically predominate among terrorists rather than among healthy controls with similar backgrounds and leanings; as well as establish conditions within the society that create a fertile ground for establishment of terrorist cells and enable general attraction to those types of movements. Only a complex, interdisciplinary approach will help the society on the quest to unravelling the mystery of individual attraction to terrorism and discovering societal structures that enable this kind of involvement.

Building on the material reviewed in this article, individual attraction to a certain extremist movement is context-dependent, while the ability to act upon that attraction must have some other explanation. After all, not everyone wants to partake in terrorist cells, nor is everyone gullible to manipulation displayed by some orthodox religious movements. Maybe there is indeed some kind of predisposition, psychological or otherwise, that we are not aware of just yet. Some Baldwin effect[93] that we are missing. The only way to find out is to develop methodology and design proper experiments to avoid speculation and substitution of concepts that dominates in the field. Unless the number of published theories stops growing faster than the number of empirical research papers, the future of terrorism research is rather foggy.

Bibliography:

Adelstein, Jonathan S, Zarrar Shehzad, Maarten Mennes, Colin G DeYoung, Xi-Nian Zuo, Clare Kelly, Daniel S Margulies, Aaron Bloomfield, Jeremy R Gray and F Xavier Castellanos. 2011. „Personality Is Reflected in the Brain’s Intrinsic Functional Architecture.“ PloS one 6(11):e27633.

Altemeyer, Bob and Bruce Hunsberger. 1992. „Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice.“ International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 2(2):113.

Altemeyer, Bob and Bruce Hunsberger. 2005. „Fundamentalism and Authoritarianism.“ Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality:378-93.

Barbey, Aron K, Roberto Colom and Jordan Grafman. 2013. „Architecture of Cognitive Flexibility Revealed by Lesion Mapping.“ Neuroimage 82:547-54.

Baron, RA and DR Richardson. 1977. „Human Aggression New York.“ Plenum Press.

Berkowitz, Leonard. 1989. „Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation.“ Psychological bulletin 106(1):59.

Bowen, Roger, Y Alexander, R Cox, M Crenshaw and D Rapoport. 1985. „Colby-College Conference Report.“ TERRORISM 8(1):79-112.

Bulbulia, Joseph and Richard Sosis. 2009. „Belief as Ideology.“ Behavior and the Brain Sciences 32(6):515-16.

Cooper, HHA. 1977. „What Is a Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective.“ Legal Med. Q. 1:16.

Crayton, John W. 1983. „Terrorism and the Psychology of the Self.“ Perspectives on Terrorism. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources:33-41.

Crenshaw, Martha. 2000. „The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.“ Political psychology 21(2):405-20.

Cristofori, Irene, Joseph Bulbulia, John H Shaver, Marc Wilson, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2016. „Neural Correlates of Mystical Experience.“ Neuropsychologia 80:212-20.

Davis, Edward B. 2005. „Science and Religious Fundamentalism in the 1920s.“ American Scientist 93(3):253-60.

DeYoung, Colin G, Jordan B Peterson and Daniel M Higgins. 2005. „Sources of Openness/Intellect: Cognitive and Neuropsychological Correlates of the Fifth Factor of Personality.“ Journal of personality 73(4):825-58.

Dollard, John, Neal E Miller, Leonard W Doob, Orval Hobart Mowrer and Robert R Sears. 1939. „Frustration and Aggression.“

Driskell, Robyn, Elizabeth Embry and Larry Lyon. 2008. „Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious Beliefs on Political Participation.“ Social Science Quarterly 89(2):294-314.

Gazzaniga, Michael. 2012. Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain: Hachette UK.

Gazzaniga, Michael S. 1988. „Mind Matters: How Mind and Brain Interact to Create Our Conscious Lives.“

Gazzaniga, Michael S. 1998. The Mind’s Past: Univ of California Press.

Ginges, Jeremy, Ian Hansen and Ara Norenzayan. 2009. „Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks.“ Psychological science 20(2):224-30.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. „Why Men Rebel, Princeton (Nj) Princeton Univ.“ Press.

Harmon, Christopher C. 2013. Terrorism Today, Vol. 7: Routledge.

Hoffer, Eric. 2002. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements: Harper Collins.

Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism: Columbia University Press.

Horgan, John. 2003. „The Search for the Terrorist Personality.“ Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences 3:27.

Hunsberger, Bruce and Lynne M Jackson. 2005. „Religion, Meaning, and Prejudice.“ Journal of social issues 61(4):807-26.

Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1990. „Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach.“ Journal for the scientific study of religion:297-314.

Kohut, Heinz. 1972. „Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage.“ The psychoanalytic study of the child 27(1):360-400.

Krueger, Alan B and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. „Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?“ Vol.: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Lewis, Gary J, Stuart J Ritchie and Timothy C Bates. 2011. „The Relationship between Intelligence and Multiple Domains of Religious Belief: Evidence from a Large Adult Us Sample.“ Intelligence 39(6):468-72.

Miller, Sears, Mowrer, Doob, & Dollard. 1941. „The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis.“ Psychological review 48(4):337.

Minogue, Kenneth. 2004. „Fundamentalism Isn’t the Problem.“ New Criterion 22(10):17-21.

Navarro, Joe and John R Schafer. 2001. „Detecting Deception.“ FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 70:9.

Pearce, KI and Harold Macmillan. 1977. „Police Negotiations: A New Role for the Community Psychiatrist.“ Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 22(4):171-75.

Post, Jerrold, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny. 2003. „The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists∗∗ This Research Was Conducted with the Support of the Smith Richardson Foundation.“ Terrorism and political Violence 15(1):171-84.

Post, Jerrold M. 1990. „Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces.“

Previc, Fred H. 2006. „The Role of the Extrapersonal Brain Systems in Religious Activity.“ Consciousness and Cognition 15(3):500-39.

Ravizza, Susan M and Cameron S Carter. 2008. „Shifting Set About Task Switching: Behavioral and Neural Evidence for Distinct Forms of Cognitive Flexibility.“ Neuropsychologia 46(12):2924-35.

Richardson. 1995. „Clinical and Personality Assessment of Participants in New Religions.“ International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 5(3):145.

Ripley, Amanda. 2002. „Why Suicide Bombing… Is Now All the Rage.“ Time 159(15):32.

Russell, Charles A. and Bowman H. Miller. 1977. „Profile of a Terrorist.“ Terrorism 1(1):17-34. doi: 10.1080/10576107708435394.

Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Scarcella, Akimi, Ruairi Page and Vivek Furtado. 2016. „Terrorism, Radicalisation, Extremism, Authoritarianism and Fundamentalism: A Systematic Review of the Quality and Psychometric Properties of Assessments.“ PLoS ONE 11(12):1-19. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0166947.

Schbley, Ayla Hammond. 2000. „Torn between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon’s Religious Terrorists.“ Studies in conflict and terrorism 23(3):175-96.

Schmid, Alex P. 1983. „Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts.“ Theories, Data Bases and Literature:70.

Shermer, Michael. 2011. The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies—How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths: Macmillan.

Shultz, Richard. 1978. „Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology.“ Journal of International Affairs:7-15.

Strentz, Thomas. 1988. „A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile: Past and Present.“ FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 57:13.

Taylor, Maxwell. 1988. The Terrorist: London.

Toepper, M, H Gebhardt, T Beblo, C Thomas, M Driessen, M Bischoff, CR Blecker, D Vaitl and G Sammer. 2010. „Functional Correlates of Distractor Suppression During Spatial Working Memory Encoding.“ Neuroscience 165(4):1244-53.

Vecchione, Michele and Gian Vittorio Caprara. 2009. „Personality Determinants of Political Participation: The Contribution of Traits and Self-Efficacy Beliefs.“ Personality and Individual Differences 46(4):487-92.

Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

Victoroff, Jeff and John Horgan. 2014.  Review of The Psychology of Terrorism [Revised and updated second edition], HorganJohn. Perspectives on Terrorism 8(4):153-55.

Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[1] Scarcella, Akimi, Ruairi Page and Vivek Furtado. 2016. „Terrorism, Radicalisation, Extremism, Authoritarianism and Fundamentalism: A Systematic Review of the Quality and Psychometric Properties of Assessments.“ PLoS ONE 11(12):1-19. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0166947.

[2] Minogue, Kenneth. 2004. „Fundamentalism Isn’t the Problem.“ New Criterion 22(10):17-21.

[3] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[4] Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism: Columbia University Press.

[5] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[6] Altemeyer, Bob and Bruce Hunsberger. 1992. „Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice.“ International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 2(2):113.

[7] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[8] Minogue, Kenneth. 2004. „Fundamentalism Isn’t the Problem.“ New Criterion 22(10):17-21.

[9] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[10] Davis, Edward B. 2005. „Science and Religious Fundamentalism in the 1920s.“ American Scientist 93(3):253-60.

[11] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Altemeyer, Bob and Bruce Hunsberger. 2005. „Fundamentalism and Authoritarianism.“ Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality:378-93.

[14] Hunsberger, Bruce and Lynne M Jackson. 2005. „Religion, Meaning, and Prejudice.“ Journal of social issues 61(4):807-26.

[15] Ginges, Jeremy, Ian Hansen and Ara Norenzayan. 2009. „Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks.“ Psychological science 20(2):224-30.

[16] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[17] Bulbulia, Joseph and Richard Sosis. 2009. „Belief as Ideology.“ Behavior and the Brain Sciences 32(6):515-16.

[18] Dopamine-rich ventral brain systems

[19] Previc, Fred H. 2006. „The Role of the Extrapersonal Brain Systems in Religious Activity.“ Consciousness and Cognition 15(3):500-39.

[20] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[21] Barbey, Aron K, Roberto Colom and Jordan Grafman. 2013. „Architecture of Cognitive Flexibility Revealed by Lesion Mapping.“ Neuroimage 82:547-54.

[22] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[23] Toepper, M, H Gebhardt, T Beblo, C Thomas, M Driessen, M Bischoff, CR Blecker, D Vaitl and G Sammer. 2010. „Functional Correlates of Distractor Suppression During Spatial Working Memory Encoding.“ Neuroscience 165(4):1244-53.

[24] Ravizza, Susan M and Cameron S Carter. 2008. „Shifting Set About Task Switching: Behavioral and Neural Evidence for Distinct Forms of Cognitive Flexibility.“ Neuropsychologia 46(12):2924-35.

[25] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Ibid.100:18-25.

[26] Adelstein, Jonathan S, Zarrar Shehzad, Maarten Mennes, Colin G DeYoung, Xi-Nian Zuo, Clare Kelly, Daniel S Margulies, Aaron Bloomfield, Jeremy R Gray and F Xavier Castellanos. 2011. „Personality Is Reflected in the Brain’s Intrinsic Functional Architecture.“ PloS one 6(11):e27633.

[27] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[28] Ibid.

[29] DeYoung, Colin G, Jordan B Peterson and Daniel M Higgins. 2005. „Sources of Openness/Intellect: Cognitive and Neuropsychological Correlates of the Fifth Factor of Personality.“ Journal of personality 73(4):825-58.

[30] Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1990. „Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach.“ Journal for the scientific study of religion:297-314.

[31] Driskell, Robyn, Elizabeth Embry and Larry Lyon. 2008. „Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious Beliefs on Political Participation.“ Social Science Quarterly 89(2):294-314.

[32] Vecchione, Michele and Gian Vittorio Caprara. 2009. „Personality Determinants of Political Participation: The Contribution of Traits and Self-Efficacy Beliefs.“ Personality and Individual Differences 46(4):487-92.

[33] Lewis, Gary J, Stuart J Ritchie and Timothy C Bates. 2011. „The Relationship between Intelligence and Multiple Domains of Religious Belief: Evidence from a Large Adult Us Sample.“ Intelligence 39(6):468-72.

[34] Hoffer, Eric. 2002. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements: Harper Collins.

[35] Zhong, Wanting, Irene Cristofori, Joseph Bulbulia, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2017. „Biological and Cognitive Underpinnings of Religious Fundamentalism.“ Neuropsychologia 100:18-25.

[36] Cristofori, Irene, Joseph Bulbulia, John H Shaver, Marc Wilson, Frank Krueger and Jordan Grafman. 2016. „Neural Correlates of Mystical Experience.“ Ibid.80:212-20.

[37] Ibid. pp. 212-213

[38] Previc, Fred H. 2006. „The Role of the Extrapersonal Brain Systems in Religious Activity.“ Consciousness and Cognition 15(3):500-39.

[39] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[40] Shultz, Richard. 1978. „Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology.“ Journal of International Affairs:7-15.

[41] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[42] Ibid. p. 7

[43] Russell, Charles A. and Bowman H. Miller. 1977. „Profile of a Terrorist.“ Terrorism 1(1):17-34. doi: 10.1080/10576107708435394.

[44] Strentz, Thomas. 1988. „A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile: Past and Present.“ FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 57:13.

[45] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ripley, Amanda. 2002. „Why Suicide Bombing… Is Now All the Rage.“ Time 159(15):32.

[48] Krueger, Alan B and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. „Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?“ Vol.: National Bureau of Economic Research.

[49] Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks: University of Pennsylvania Press.

[50] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[51] Ibid. p.10

[52] Ibid. pp. 12-13

[53] Cooper, HHA. 1977. „What Is a Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective.“ Legal Med. Q. 1:16.

[54] Pearce, KI and Harold Macmillan. 1977. „Police Negotiations: A New Role for the Community Psychiatrist.“ Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 22(4):171-75.

[55] Taylor, Maxwell. 1988. The Terrorist: London.

[56] Kohut, Heinz. 1972. „Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage.“ The psychoanalytic study of the child 27(1):360-400.

[57] Crayton, John W. 1983. „Terrorism and the Psychology of the Self.“ Perspectives on Terrorism. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources:33-41.

[58] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[59] Post, Jerrold M. 1990. „Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces.“

[60] Bowen, Roger, Y Alexander, R Cox, M Crenshaw and D Rapoport. 1985. „Colby-College Conference Report.“ TERRORISM 8(1):79-112.

[61] Horgan, John. 2003. „The Search for the Terrorist Personality.“ Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences 3:27.

[62] Post, Jerrold, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny. 2003. „The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists∗∗ This Research Was Conducted with the Support of the Smith Richardson Foundation.“ Terrorism and political Violence 15(1):171-84.

[63] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[64] Shermer, Michael. 2011. The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies—How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths: Macmillan.

[65] Gazzaniga, Michael S. 1998. The Mind’s Past: Univ of California Press.

[66] Gazzaniga, Michael S. 1988. „Mind Matters: How Mind and Brain Interact to Create Our Conscious Lives.“

[67] Gazzaniga, Michael. 2012. Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain: Hachette UK.

[68] Crenshaw, Martha. 2000. „The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.“ Political psychology 21(2):405-20.

[69] Gazzaniga, Michael S. 1998. The Mind’s Past: Univ of California Press.

[70] Navarro, Joe and John R Schafer. 2001. „Detecting Deception.“ FBI L. Enforcement Bull. 70:9.

[71] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[72] Schbley, Ayla Hammond. 2000. „Torn between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon’s Religious Terrorists.“ Studies in conflict and terrorism 23(3):175-96.

[73] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Post, Jerrold, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny. 2003. „The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists∗∗ This Research Was Conducted with the Support of the Smith Richardson Foundation.“ Terrorism and political Violence 15(1):171-84.

[77] Schmid, Alex P. 1983. „Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts.“ Theories, Data Bases and Literature:70.

[78] Hoffer, Eric. 2002. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements: Harper Collins.

[79] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[80] Hoffer, Eric. 2002. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements: Harper Collins.

[81] Berkowitz, Leonard. 1989. „Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation.“ Psychological bulletin 106(1):59.

[82] Dollard, John, Neal E Miller, Leonard W Doob, Orval Hobart Mowrer and Robert R Sears. 1939. „Frustration and Aggression.“

[83] Baron, RA and DR Richardson. 1977. „Human Aggression New York.“ Plenum Press.

[84] Berkowitz, Leonard. 1989. „Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation.“ Psychological bulletin 106(1):59.

[85] Miller, Sears, Mowrer, Doob, & Dollard. 1941. „The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis.“ Psychological review 48(4):337.

[86] Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. „The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.“ Journal of Conflict resolution 49(1):3-42.

[87] Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. „Why Men Rebel, Princeton (Nj) Princeton Univ.“ Press.

[88] Harmon, Christopher C. 2013. Terrorism Today, Vol. 7: Routledge.

[89] Krueger, Alan B and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. „Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?“ Vol.: National Bureau of Economic Research.

[90] Victoroff, Jeff and John Horgan. 2014.  Review of The Psychology of Terrorism [Revised and updated second edition], HorganJohn. Perspectives on Terrorism 8(4):153-55.

[91] Richardson. 1995. „Clinical and Personality Assessment of Participants in New Religions.“ International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 5(3):145.

[92] Research is further complicated by the fact that even though terrorists are different from other people, it does not mean they are different to the same degree, which is evident due to multitude of possible involvement categories in a terrorist organization.

[93] Baldwin effect describes effects of learned behaviour on evolution, thus, how learned behaviour in one generation can manifest itself as predisposition to learn certain behavioural patterns in further generations.

Reklamy

Zanechat odpověď

Vyplňte detaily níže nebo klikněte na ikonu pro přihlášení:

Logo WordPress.com

Komentujete pomocí vašeho WordPress.com účtu. Odhlásit /  Změnit )

Google+ photo

Komentujete pomocí vašeho Google+ účtu. Odhlásit /  Změnit )

Twitter picture

Komentujete pomocí vašeho Twitter účtu. Odhlásit /  Změnit )

Facebook photo

Komentujete pomocí vašeho Facebook účtu. Odhlásit /  Změnit )

Připojování k %s